ExpertsFMConnor Teskey: Inside Brookfield’s Culture, Capital Allocation, and Competitive Edge
The Knowledge Project · March 17, 2026
5 Selected Lessons:
heuristic · 1 priority · 1 framework · 1 reasoning_pattern · 1 case · 1
Two most common reasons to walk away from a deal
Source
The Knowledge Project — Connor Teskey: Inside Brookfield’s Culture, Capital Allocation, and Competitive Edge (March 17, 2026) · at 21:23 ▸
When this applies
when deciding whether to kill a deal already in diligence across any industry
The takeaway
Concentrate diligence scrutiny on revenue-construct/counterparty quality and on development-risk-to-return ratio as the dominant failure modes.
Why it works
Revenue certainty (and the credit behind it) and the ratio of construction/development risk to return are the two levers that most directly determine whether an investment's risk-adjusted return clears the bar.
Where it stops holding
This stops working when other factors (e.g. regulatory, ESG, geopolitical) dominate in a given market or sector, making these two not the primary kill criteria.
Detail
hierarchy:
- 1. Don't like the revenue construct or the corporate credit counterparty backstopping it.
- 2. Too much construction/development risk relative to the return generated.
rationale: These two reasons account for the majority of deals walked away from after initial pursuit.
In their words
We don't like the revenue construct or the corporate credit counterparty that backstops that revenue construct. That would be reason one. Or reason two, it's too much construction or development risk relative to the return that the opportunity generates.
Local autonomy with centralized capital allocation
Source
The Knowledge Project — Connor Teskey: Inside Brookfield’s Culture, Capital Allocation, and Competitive Edge (March 17, 2026) · at 21:23 ▸
When this applies
when managing a decentralized organization that needs both local market knowledge and disciplined global capital allocation
The takeaway
Decentralize sourcing/execution/operations to local experts, but centralize the final resource-allocation decision to preserve relative, global comparison.
Why it works
Local teams see market dynamics first and can source/operate effectively, but centralizing the final capital-deployment decision gives a small group global visibility to compare opportunities across regions on a risk-adjusted basis, preventing capital from going to a locally-best-but-globally-mediocre deal.
One level up
Autonomy and central control aren't opposites — decentralize execution, centralize allocation decisions.
Where it stops holding
This stops working when the centralized group lacks the bandwidth or expertise to evaluate diverse deal types fairly, causing bottlenecks or biased comparisons.
Detail
procedure:
- Place local investment, operating, and fundraising professionals in every market where the firm invests or operates.
- Give local teams autonomy and accountability to source, execute, and operate.
- Require all capital deployment decisions to be approved centrally by a tight group.
- Use that central group's cross-market visibility to allocate capital to the best risk-adjusted opportunity globally, even if a local opportunity is the best seen in that region in years.
benchmarks: {}
rationale: Combines growth benefits of deep local knowledge with the discipline and perspective of centralized oversight.
In their words
We've pursued a model where those local teams are given the responsibility and the autonomy and the accountability to source, execute, and operate very independently
Transmitting lived-through-the-cycle wisdom to those who haven't lived it
Source
The Knowledge Project — Connor Teskey: Inside Brookfield’s Culture, Capital Allocation, and Competitive Edge (March 17, 2026) · at 40:44 ▸
When this applies
when an organization must instill hard-won crisis lessons in people who have no direct experience of crisis
The takeaway
Institutionalize lessons from past crises into explicit, repeated cultural doctrine, and pair inexperienced talent with experienced mentors rather than relying on personal experience alone.
Why it works
Explicit, repeated articulation of 'this is our approach and here's why, with historical examples of when it mattered' substitutes for lived experience, while deliberately pairing inexperienced high-energy staff with cycle-tested seniors creates an experiential bridge.
Where it stops holding
This stops working when the stated doctrine isn't reinforced by real incentives or examples, becoming empty rhetoric that juniors don't actually internalize until they are burned themselves.
Detail
approach: Explicitly teach culture/principles with historical examples day-in day-out; mix young energetic staff with experienced cycle-tested colleagues on teams.
signals:
- New hires without crisis experience but receiving explicit explanation of why principles matter
- Deliberate team composition mixing age/experience
rationale: Culture becomes the vehicle for transmitting lessons that would otherwise require decades of personal pain to learn.
In their words
This is where I think culture within an organization is so valuable. We really instill these principles day in, day out across our business to the young man or woman who's just come out of school, who doesn't have any investing experience.
Judgment over model precision
Source
The Knowledge Project — Connor Teskey: Inside Brookfield’s Culture, Capital Allocation, and Competitive Edge (March 17, 2026) · at 7:25 ▸
When this applies
when analysts over-invest in false precision of quantitative models for decisions with inherent uncertainty
The takeaway
Recognize the limits of quantitative modeling and consciously overlay qualitative judgment where inputs are uncertain.
Why it works
Excel models convey a false sense of certainty; many inputs are genuinely unknowable, so judgment must be overlaid on the model rather than trusting its precision.
One level up
Precision of tools should not be confused with accuracy of underlying reality.
Where it stops holding
This stops working when the variables truly are knowable and modelable, in which case rigor adds real value rather than false confidence.
Detail
rule: Don't chase false precision in models; overlay good judgment for things outside your control.
threshold: n/a
rationale: Excel can make uncertain things look certain, misleading decision-makers.
In their words
There's almost a false degree of precision in today's world of Excel. The reality is so many times you just have to overlay good judgment and you have to recognize there are certain things outside of your control that your Excel model will seem like a certainty, but aren't.
Oaktree acquisition — reverse-engineering competitor valuation via self-knowledge
Source
The Knowledge Project — Connor Teskey: Inside Brookfield’s Culture, Capital Allocation, and Competitive Edge (March 17, 2026) · at 1:10:34 ▸ · at 1:14:04 ▸
When this applies
when trying to evaluate a competitor or peer company whose business model resembles your own
The takeaway
Use deep self-knowledge of your own business model as an analytical lens to find undervalued peers or competitors with a similar structure, then look beyond 'cheap' to whether a strategic combination unlocks additional value.
Why it works
Deeply understanding your own organization's value drivers and growth trajectory gives you a template for underwriting a structurally similar peer business, surfacing mispricing (undervaluation) that the market, lacking that internal template, misses.
One level up
The best idea-generation sometimes comes from applying an internal mental model to an external target, rather than analyzing the target in isolation.
Where it stops holding
This stops working when the peer's business, despite superficial similarity, differs in ways your internal model doesn't capture (different regulatory, cyclicality, or capital structure dynamics).
Detail
situation: Early in his career, Teskey was asked to evaluate another distressed alternative asset manager and struggled until he realized he could use his understanding of Brookfield's own growth/value drivers as an analytical framework. He later applied this lens to track peers including Oaktree, noticing it was undervalued and countercyclical (strong in opportunistic credit during downturns).
decision: Teskey brought the undervaluation thesis to Bruce Flatt, who redirected it from 'buy cheap' to 'find something strategic' (filling Brookfield's gap in credit expertise), leading to a 2019 deal to buy out the public float and partner with Oaktree's founders/management.
outcome: Oaktree broadened its product offering and performed exceptionally during COVID, delivering a step-change in growth for the business.
lesson: Combining a 'this looks cheap' observation with a 'what strategic value could we unlock' question (posed by a senior leader) turned a value trade into a transformative strategic acquisition.
In their words
I remember at the beginning of 2018, going to Bruce and saying, this company looks very undervalued. And he gave me one very simple piece of feedback, which was, you're right, it looks undervalued. But what would be amazing is could we do something strategic with them?