Source
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When this applies
when judging whether any heavily-leveraged boom sector is near a correction
The takeaway
Watch for narrow risk spreads and institutional complacency, not just leverage levels, as the real tell that a system is unprepared for a shock.
Why it works
Risk-pricing mechanisms (credit rating agencies, risk desks, spread pricing) fail to adjust when a sector has no recent history of default, so spreads stay too narrow relative to true risk until a shock exposes it.
One level up
The absence of recent failure is often mistaken for safety, which is itself the precondition for the next failure.
Where it stops holding
This stops working when the sector has already repriced risk appropriately or when leverage is low enough that a shock cannot cascade into margin calls.
Detail
rule: Look for narrow spreads between real risk and priced risk, and for how deeply the 'official' risk-watchers (not just media) have modeled scenarios.
threshold: Spreads perceived as 'too narrow' relative to historical precedent-free sectors (e.g., no prior default history).
rationale: Historically, catastrophic credit events (2008, LTCM, Leopold's fund) were preceded by widespread complacency among the people supposed to monitor risk.
In their words
Complacency is the first thing you look at. When it happened in 2008, 2010, there was a handful of people, which there's always been documentaries about these guys that made money on shorting the housing market. But everybody else in the world had no idea what was really happening. It was complacency, complete, you know?